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Dynamics of internal R&D stakeholders in the Fuzzy Front-End of breakthrough engineering 
projects 
ABSTRACT 
 
In competitive industries, intensive innovation is a recognized necessity (Wheelwright and Clark, 
1992; Le Masson et al., 2010). One success factor of breakthrough R&D projects lies in the 
knowledge articulation between innovation definition phases, composed of fuzzy front-end 
(FFE) and innovative new product development (NPD) stages (Koen et al, 2002; Cooper et al, 
2001), and industrial development processes. Then, central issue for innovation projects 
managers becomes internal R&D stakeholders’ management (Elias et al., 2002) and sustainable 
learning dynamics across the two parts of the organization (O’Connor, 2008). Our paper fits into 
this research gap for local breakthrough R&D in the dominant design. We discuss the role of 
technical expertise level of NDP stakeholders involved in early stages of innovative projects. The 
research mobilized two longitudinal studies (Yin, 1989) carried out with a global car manufacturer 
through collaborative management research (Radaelli et al., 2012) since 2005, one focusing on 
the FFE management, while the other was devoted to learning dynamics of engineering 
development departments. A cartography of the internal network of breakthrough R&D (Mitchell 
et al, 1997) underlined a stable organizational network across projects. Nevertheless, a 
quantitative analysis of accounting data on 8 projects highlights important dynamics of 
involvement or dis-engagement within the network. The analysis showed that the accounting 
reporting at the portfolio level used to hide to top-managers the heterogeneity and depth of 
resources dynamics at the project level. The impacts of local breakthrough R&D on the 
engineering development organization was similar to waves: some stakeholders, who played 
roles of experts, spokespersons or innovation design strategists, were able to involve quickly the 
individuals to maintain the project progress, sometime generating an over-commitment on 
innovation projects. At the opposite, a lack of trust of the design partners generated withdrawal 
of resources that needed a strong stakeholder management to be prevented. 
Keywords: Breakthrough R&D; Stakeholders; Commitment 
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Nevertheless, a quantitative analysis of accounting data on 8 projects highlights important dynamics of 
involvement or dis-engagement within the network. The analysis showed that the accounting reporting at the 
portfolio level used to hide to top-managers the heterogeneity and depth of resources dynamics at the project 
level. The impacts of local breakthrough R&D on the engineering development organization was similar to 
waves: some stakeholders, who played roles of experts, spokespersons or innovation design strategists, were 
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commitment on innovation projects. At the opposite, a lack of trust of the design partners generated withdrawal 
of resources that needed a strong stakeholder management to be prevented. 
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Introduction  
Industrial expectations of management research on breakthrough R&D project processes have two 
main dimensions, as follows: first, measurement and performance management of activities and, 
second, models of financing innovation projects that disrupt established organizations and business 
models. Referring to these issues, many studies have described the components of the management 
process that designs, deploys and maintains a cross-functional management of innovation projects 
from the early stages of design to the commercial phase of new product development (NPD) 
(Weelwright and Clark, 1992). Breakthrough R&D projects could be distinguished from others 
optimization R&D projects as they include a Fuzzy Front-End (FFE) stage of ideation (Koen et al., 
2002) before the other stages of New Product Development. Due to opposite logics of uncertainties 
management, these projects were dissociated as exploratory projects (Lenfle, 2008) or creative 
projects (Gillier, Hooge and Piat, 2015) from the R&D projects that follow traditional funnel portfolio 
approaches (Weelwright and Clark, 1992). Thus, compared to conventional forms of management of 
NPD, a breakthrough innovation project in a dominant design is characterized by the existence of an 
FFE phase; uncertainties surrounding each managerial component of a project during all the steps of 
the R&D project (goals, constraints, management and organizational structures); dynamic planning 
progress and its associated managerial decisions (recurrent validation, redirection or stop); and a more 
complex network of stakeholders within the company who influence the advancement of the project 
and its guidelines (Lenfle, 2008; Le Masson et al, 2010). Connections between the two managerial 
logics have been largely studied. Processes are intended to describe the maturity levels and content of 
decision milestones to ensure the robustness of projects at each stage of NPD, including the FFE stage 
(Cooper et al, 2001), to help achieve an internal consensus between FFE and NPD actors in terms of 
the value of the project and its potential deliverables (Hooge and Hatchuel, 2008), to secure and 
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stabilize the allocation of resources (Hall, 2000), and to introduce flexibility in projects’ funding in 
accordance with decisions that were made at milestones (Akroyd et al, 2006).  
 
To establish a unified monitoring process of R&D projects in the FFE and NPD stages, it is therefore 
necessary to identify actors and decision makers of these projects and their expectations of the 
management process. This dimension of project management concentrates on the building and the 
gradual strengthening of internal R&D stakeholders’ commitment (Mitchell et al, 1997) to the 
company’s breakthrough innovation projects. If one considers that the funding of breakthrough 
innovation is a consequence of the involvement of internal stakeholders, then the identification of 
internal stakeholders and these internal stakeholders’ commitment to breakthrough innovation 
projects are leading issues of the R&D management process. The current paper fills this research gap 
by studying the conditions of the identification of internal R&D stakeholders of breakthrough 
innovation projects. Furthermore, we study the impact of the engineering expertise of this player 
network to support the innovative activity in companies with a strong dominant design (Utterback, 
1994; Henderson and Clark, 1990). The research relies on a long-term collaborative partnership 
(Adler et al., 2004; Shani et al., 2008) with a global car manufacturer that focused on the managerial 
process to improve the management of stakeholders in highly innovative R&D projects. The authors 
conducted two longitudinal studies (Yin, 1989) with the car manufacturer since 2005. One study 
focused on the FFE management process and organization, and the other focused on NPD 
management, and especially learning dynamics within the engineering development department. As 
these studies represent collaborative management research, data analyses were enhanced through in-
depth interviews with project managers, technical experts and decision makers.!!  
 
Theoretical framework on internal R&D stakeholders: purpose and issues 
Internal Stakeholders of R&D projects 
Since the creation of the word "stakeholder" by Ansoff and Stewart in 1963, and particularly since the 
work of Freeman in 1984, Stakeholder Theory has progressively been deployed through several books 
and numerous scholarly papers that have described and improved various approaches to the strategic 
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management of stakeholders (Elias, Cavana and Jackson, 2002; Savage et al., 2011). Beyond the 
scope of analyzing the firm through its industrial and economics trades, Stakeholder Theory integrates 
social and political exchanges between actors (Post et al., 2002; Wilson, Bunn and Savage, 2010). The 
abundance of research in this field has led to the coexistence of many definitions of the stakeholder 
concept and divergent approaches, as follows: descriptive, instrumental or normative approaches 
(Donaldson and Preston, 1995), strategic or ethical approaches (Jones and Wicks, 1999), etc. This 
divergence has led to confusion or ambiguity about the content of Stakeholder Theory, and central 
definitions remain debated for a decade (see, e.g., Elias and Cavana, 2000; Freeman et al., 2012). 
Nevertheless, the various streams agree on the significance of the systematic identification of 
stakeholders to enhance a firm’s performance. Specifically, they agree that the understanding of 
expectations and stakes of the various actors involved in an activity determines the potential success 
of the collaboration in regards to achieving targets. As highlighted by Andrioff and Waddock (2002), 
the identification exercise is a component of organizational control; without the commitment of 
stakeholders on a project, the entire organization may no longer support the activity.!
Freeman’s definition of stakeholders, i.e., “any individual or group who can affect the achievement of 
an organization’s objectives or who is affected by the achievement of an organization’s objectives” 
(Freeman, 1984 - 91), is the most popular definition in the literature. In the context of R&D projects, 
scholars have used the more accurate definition of internal stakeholders proposed by Post, Preston and 
Sachs (2002 -13): “ The stakeholders in a firm are individuals and constituencies that contribute, 
either voluntarily or involuntarily, to its wealth-creating capacity and activities, and who are 
therefore its potential beneficiaries and/or risk bearers”. This specific definition focuses on the 
management of internal networks of a firm, including external stakeholders’ stakes and expectations 
based on interactions with their representatives inside the firm. 
From an operative point of view that extends Freeman’s work, many authors have stressed the 
importance of an effective definition of stakeholders to achieve an R&D project (Mitchell, Agle and 
Wood, 97; Coombs et al., 1998). Since the end of the 90’s, a lot of studies have investigated this 
specific issue of R&D stakeholder and project management (Olander and Landin 2005, Achterkamp 
and Vos 2008, Jepsen and Eskerod 2009, Aaltonen 2011). Nevertheless, the approach of Mitchell, 
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Agle and Wood (1997) remains a theoretical reference as their research proposes an analytical 
framework to shed light onto the potential dissymmetry between stakeholders through preliminary 
interactions. These authors described the actors impacted by a project according to their cumulative 
ownership of the following three managerial attributes:  " Power: the stakeholder has coercive, utilitarian or normative ability to impose its will in the 
relationship;  " Legitimacy: judgments and acts of the stakeholder are commonly perceived or assumed as 
desirable, proper and appropriate; " Urgency: others consider the stakeholder’s claims to be critical or highly important.    
Players with more of these attributes should be considered as more essential in steering the project, 
and their aims and expectations must be integrated into the FFE and NPD processes of a breakthrough 
innovation. The attributes of power and legitimacy were presented in the work of Freeman, but 
Mitchell, Agle and Wood included the concept of urgency, feeding the views of a dynamic 
management of stakeholders. Indeed, these authors emphasized the influence of time on stakeholders’ 
attributes (Mitchell, Agle and Wood, 1997 - 879): “Static maps of a firm’s stakeholder environment 
are heuristically useful if the intent is to raise consciousness about « Who or What Really Counts »1 to 
managers or to specify the stakeholder configuration at a particular time point. But even though most 
theorists might try for static clarity, managers should never forget that stakeholders change in 
salience, requiring different degrees and types of attention depending on their attributed possession of 
power, legitimacy, and/or urgency, and that levels of these attributes (and thereby salience) can vary 
from issue to issue and from time to time.”  
In later research on R&D stakeholders’ management, Elias, Cavana and Jackson (2002) proposed a 
combination of Freeman’s and Mitchell, Agle and Wood’s recommendations to establish an 8-step 
process for the systematic identification of stakeholders, their interests in an R&D project and actors’ 
attributes mapping. With this process, R&D project leaders plan to systematize the association of the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Authors refer to the principle of the same name previously developed by Freeman: “ On such principle, which I will call ‘’The Principle of 
Who and What Really Count’’, says that the primary function of the corporation is to enhance the economic well-being, or serve as a 
vehicle for the free choices of, the owners of the corporation” (Freeman, 1994). 
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identification of a new actor with the description of its expectations and its bargaining power with 
other actors.  
Although the definition of R&D project stakeholder has been clarified and the purpose of their 
dynamic identification has been demonstrated, scholars have underlined that the tools to 
operationalize dynamic identification and the process to manage stakeholders once they have been 
identified remain under-investigated issues, especially in the FFE stage of an R&D project (Bessant et 
al., 2010). Indeed, identification does not provide evidence on the efficiency of stakeholders’ 
involvement in breakthrough R&D projects. 
 
The research gap between the identification of internal R&D stakeholders and the commitment 
of relevant stakeholders for the progress and achievement of breakthrough R&D projects 
Breakthrough innovation projects differ from other design activities of new product development due 
to their ability to introduce new design rules into the NPD process or to change corporate standards 
(Utterback, 1994; Le Masson, Hatchuel and Weil, 2010). Thus, NPD projects in large industrial firms 
are the result of multidisciplinary interactions of an abundant, dynamic and complex network of 
actors. According to L. Meade and A. Presley (2002), internal stakeholders of an innovation project 
fall into the following four groups of skills and roles in a R&D project: management, marketing, 
manufacturing and technologists. Understandably, these four types of actors convey specific needs 
and expectations for radical innovation projects, and their needs and expectations are often 
contradictory. This diversity raises a central issue in the management of internal stakeholders, as 
follows: if the size of the network could place the progress of the project at risk, who are the relevant 
actors to involve in a breakthrough R&D project? 
A first approach to this issue is proposed in actor network theory (ANT), where the sociologist M. 
Callon and his colleagues highlighted the specific role of mediator played by some actors that are able 
to interest and enroll other stakeholders in an activity (Callon, 1986; Akrich et al., 2002a; Akrich et 
al., 2002b). According to the indefinite state of a project’s innovative outputs in the first stages, it is 
not uncommon for debates on innovation potentials to feed exacerbated reactions of supporters and 
opponents’ players inside a stakeholder’s network (Akrich et al., 2002a). These authors claimed that 
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an innovation project cannot be achieved without a sufficient number of allies that will support the 
progress of the activity (ibid), but they also highlighted that such efficient alignment could be 
overcome by spokespersons that know how to convince people to support the activity (Akrich et al., 
2002b). Spokespersons are not devoted to integrating and reconciling the wishes of all stakeholders; 
rather, they feed the interactions between them to facilitate the progress of the project. 
 
A second approach to relevant stakeholders is proposed by the application of knowledge creation 
theory to radical innovation processes (Nonaka, 1991; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; Nonaka and 
Peltokorpi, 2006). According to Nonaka and Peltokorpi (2006 - 90), radical innovation processes 
succeed because “through their small-world networks, people locate external collaborators with the 
right knowledge to speed up the product-development process”. As much of the necessary knowledge 
is tacit, the involvement of experts and knowers who have the pertinent skills and knowledge at the 
right time is compulsory to successfully achieve the project (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995). Moreover, 
in the case of breakthrough innovation projects, all relevant experts and knowers are rarely identified 
in NPD stages, particularly in the FFE stage. Building the network of appropriate and competent 
individuals in the innovation takes place over time and is associated with the identification of business 
opportunities and definition of competitive technical deliverables. 
A third approach to internal R&D stakeholders is specified by innovation capability theory (Hatchuel, 
Weil and Le Masson, 2003). Beyond the social process and the learning process, a strategic process 
occurs that supports the innovative design orientation. Acting as innovative design strategists, some 
managers are able to generate design metaphors of expected concepts of innovation, which are forms 
of framing or guiding patterns that drive the collective action. 
Based on the design metaphor provided by the innovation strategist, FFE & innovative NPD 
engineering designers could use existing knowledge or products for original applications. These 
designers generate and combine lineages of products and lineages of knowledge to design a new 
product, process or service. Disseminating the design metaphors in FFE and NPD projects, innovative 
design strategists appear as key actors to coordinate both structural dynamics and knowledge creation. 
In later work, the authors described this activity of innovative design strategy as the ability to build a 
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specific orientation to create new design rules and to assess the generativeness and robustness of these 
new rules within the firm’s design context (Hatchuel et al, 2011).  
 
In the framework of Mitchell et al. (1997), spokespersons, experts and design strategists must at least 
have the legitimacy attribute to be effectively convincing. Nevertheless, these key actors are not 
necessarily committed to leading the project; rather, they could emerge from many areas of the 
stakeholders’ network of the project. Consequently, relevant NPD stakeholders are often 
overextended in large firms and face a scarcity of time for debating the different points of view. Yet, 
spokespersons, experts and innovative designers could defend different rationales of the opportunities 
of a project in the FFE or NPD stages, even if their visions could efficiently be confronted. In 
response to this predicament, reasons to consider decisions as illegitimate within the framework are 
proliferating. To avoid this locking situation, project leaders involve the key stakeholders in a process 
that is independent of decision committees that “consist of myriad actions, negotiations, and micro-
decisions in the effort to create strong networks, leaving few decisions for the official gate and 
portfolio meetings” (Christiansen and Varnes, 2007 - 282). This interactive process also protects the 
R&D project from powerful players’ games within large firms’ innovation committees, which are 
typically chaired by corporate leaders. Indeed, players’ divergent positions without prior consultation 
with other actors may be perceived as their desire to get ahead personally and, therefore, presents a 
high risk of conflict, whose outcome is highly uncertain for the project because the debate could lose 
its rationality.  
Building a common orientation among stakeholders is therefore based on the quality of the interactive 
process before the decision-making sessions where consensus about the goals of the next project’s 
stage will ultimately be achieved. As the competitive benefit of a breakthrough innovation project is 
intrinsically unclear at the beginning of the project, it appears that this action / negotiation process 
between internal stakeholders leads to the collaborative design of the value of the innovation project 
for the firm. Thus, the identification and commitment process of actors must be led by the following 
question: how can project leaders know if the actors that they identified as relevant stakeholders are 
able to explicate and build value for the firm to propose new design rules of product or process? 
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Research materials and investigation methods 
The current research mobilized two longitudinal studies (Yin, 1989) that were carried out with a 
global car manufacturer between 2005 and 2010. One study focused on the innovation management 
process and organizational capability for innovation (Author’s references), and the other focused on 
the learning dynamics of engineering development departments, especially in the sub-department of 
Car Body & Assembly (CBA) (Author’s references). The two studies discussed the issue of the 
involvement of traditional NPD actors in breakthrough innovation activities from the first steps of 
design to the implementation of the new design rules in engineering development departments and the 
benefits of the crossed perspectives of the knowledge that the researchers acquired on stakeholders 
from the two parts of the organization. The distinctive features of the studied project portfolio lie in its 
technological and organizational variety, which allows multiple case studies in a unified context. 
Indeed, R&D projects have very different technical and economic challenges and types of 
stakeholders. Similar to all global car manufacturers, the partner firm has a range of innovation 
projects that cover many fields of technologies (mechanics, aerodynamics, air quality, material 
dynamics and recycling, NTIC, etc.), services (BtoB, BtoC) and business models (unique sell, pooled 
offer, leasing, rent, etc.) that are more or less intrusive in the dominant design paradigm (e.g., 
breakthrough R&D projects range from new seat mechanics for a car that is already in the firm’s 
range to new car architecture with some updatable parts that could be purchased later). This diversity 
of content is also combined with a wide variety of stakeholders’ networks involved in breakthrough 
R&D projects. In 2007, the engineering department of the partner firm gathered approximately ten 
thousand people, who were organized into sub-departments. Both authors collected rich and 
longitudinal material on breakthrough R&D projects through intervention research methodology 
(Hatchuel and David, 2007; Radaelli et al, 2012). The first study was conducted with the sub-
department of Research of Advanced Engineering (R&AE), whose managers were in charge of the 
projects and portfolios of breakthrough R&D. The department also possessed specific skills of 
research and advanced engineering in automotive competitive domains (e.g., electronic, material, 
architecture, ergonomic). The second longitudinal research was in partnership with the Car Body & 
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Assembly sub-department, which included one thousand collaborators and a half thousand 
engineering sub-contractors who were dedicated to the industrial development of the product and 
process of the body-in-white of all car programs and the painting process. They were subdivided into 
four technical services (i.e., design, assembly, stamping and painting), which each included up to two 
hundred people, and four project services (one per range of car programs). Overall, 75% of resources 
were dedicated to ongoing car program development. Knowers and experts who were needed for their 
knowledge of R&AE projects were especially placed in those engineering teams. Analyses of the 
intervention research of the projects were enhanced through in-depth interviews with fuzzy front-end 
and NPD project managers, technical and marketing experts and decision makers.  
Beyond qualitative analysis, our approach differs from the majority of previous studies on the 
identification of internal R&D stakeholders due to its in-depth analysis of resource allocation and 
consumption in innovation projects. We accessed detailed accounting data of R&AE projects, budget 
allocations and expenses and data on the composition and evolution of project teams through the daily 
time tracking of collaborators. This method allowed us to precisely quantify the effective involvement 
of actors from all engineering teams. This quantitative analysis was conducted for all breakthrough 
R&D projects of the firm from the beginning of 2007 to the end of 2009, but we focus on the 2007 
data in the current study due to the impact of the worldwide car crisis on engineering investments in 
2008 and 2009. 
 
To distinguish breakthrough R&D from conventional R&D, the type of project was labeled in the firm 
“project of Research and Advanced Engineering (R&AE)” even if the project was in a stage of FFE or 
innovative NPD. Dedicated project portfolio managers and project leaders managed R&AE projects 
until their transfer to car program and industrial development teams (i.e., they managed the FFE and 
first steps of innovative NPD). As engineering resources were disseminated across the entire 
Engineering department, R&AE teams worked with many technical organizational areas of the firm 
and consulted and involved the stakeholders of other departments of the firm, e.g., market analysts, 
industrial designers, and costs economists, to achieve their projects. A breakthrough R&D project was 
considered in FFE engineering until the competitive target of innovation was clarified and quantified 
! 11 
(consumer benefit in the case of innovative products and services; internal performance in the case of 
innovative industrial process). Then, the R&AE project became a NPD engineering project, but it was 
still considered a breakthrough R&D activity, as technical solutions and business models remained 
mainly undefined. R&AE projects only ended when the maturity of the innovation definition reached 
the expected level for a transfer to industrial development teams. 
At the end of 2006, the strategic plan of R&AE projects forecasted 67 projects in FFE engineering 
and 62 projects in innovative NPD engineering. At the end of 2007, R&AE resource allocation 
showed 111 active projects (50 in FFE and 61 in innovative NPD). The CBA sub-department was 
involved in 9 of these projects, 7 as a design partner and 2 as the lead team. The figures below present 
the repartition of the number of design partners in the portfolio within the engineering department 
(Table 1) and the number and organizational area of individuals who were involved in the 10 projects 
with CBA (Table 2). 
 
Table 1. Distribution of accounting entries by maturity level of R&AE projects  
 Fuzzy Front-End 
Engineering 
Innovative NPD 
Engineering 
 
Process Product Process Product 
Number of projects analyzed  19 31 8 53 111 
Meta-
divisions of 
Engineering 
Department 
Research & Advanced Engineering 33 49 21 130 233 
Industrial 
development 
Engineering 
 Technical definition Draft 1 1 5 23 30 
Engine Engineering 2 4 2 18 26 
Car Engineering  
(including CBA) 11 16 14 84 125 
Total accounting entries (per org. area) 47 70 42 255 414 
 
Table 2. Amount of design partners in R&AE projects with CBA 
Maturity / 
Innovation 
Type 
Projects 
Weight of the 
project in k€ 
(real costs) 
Number of organizational areas 
involved Number of individuals involved 
All Eng. Dept. CBA Dept. All Eng. Dept. CBA Dept. 
FFE- 
Process 
A 285 k€ 7 1 16 1 
B 1045 k€ 5 1 31 1 
NPD- 
Process 
C 1 130 k€ 7 2 8 6 
D 306 k€ 2 1 11 9 
E 4 750 k€ 6 5 56 55 
FFE- 
Product 
F 197 k€ 2 1 12 10 
G 13 k€ 1 1 3 3 
NPD- 
Product 
H 243 k€ 7 2 7 1 
I 91 k€ 7 1 4 0 
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In addition to accounting analysis, these projects were studied qualitatively from mid-2005 to mid-
2010 through intervention research and interviews with project leaders and managers, providing both 
authors with an in-depth understanding of these projects’ management from their initiation as 
breakthrough R&D projects to their transfer to engineering departments for application in a car 
program. Thus, the gathered material allowed us to qualitatively and quantitatively discuss the 
management of internal R&D stakeholders from the view of both the intensity of stakeholders’ 
involvement, across committed and spent resources on the project’s budget and resources 
consumption, and the relevancy of involved stakeholders, across the impact of the actors’ 
involvement on the progress of the project. 
 
Case study analysis: what is expected from an internal stakeholder commitment process 
for breakthrough R&D projects?  
To tackle the research gap on the management of relevant internal R&D stakeholders for FFE and 
NPD projects, we began our study with a detailed characterization of the actor network that our 
partner’s firm had to build to conduct breakthrough R&D activities. In 2007 and 2008, we conducted 
two different analyses of the data simultaneously to understand the nature of the network of internal 
R&D stakeholders of the firm partner that we describe below. The first analysis modeled the network 
from an organizational approach of collaborators’ interactions, and the second analysis quantified the 
involvement of internal contributors from an accounting approach, monitoring the budgeting and 
consumption of resources of breakthrough R&D projects. This analytical phase was conducted to 
understand and model the following three points: " The characteristics of the internal R&D stakeholders of a breakthrough R&D project (through a 
systematic description of their official roles in the organization of the firm and in the project); " How they affected or were affected by the progress of the activity (crossing the framework of 
(Mitchell et al., 1997) with the approach of spokesperson, experts and knowers or innovative 
design strategists); 
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" How intensively they were involved in breakthrough R&D projects and how their resources 
involvement impacted the progress of the project (in-depth analysis of accounting data). 
 
Building a cartography of internal stakeholders of breakthrough R&D projects 
To model R&D stakeholders’ interactions within the firm partner, we first used the model of 
concentric circles of power / legitimacy / urgency attributes developed by Mitchell, Agle and Wood 
(1997). This typology facilitates early identification of stakeholders because it is very meaningful for 
managers of R&D projects and portfolios. During interviews, they easily placed concrete actors into 
these categories, as follows: holders of power were most often resources owners and corporate 
managers; holders of legitimacy were technical, costs and market experts or experimented leaders; 
and holders of the emergency were those who bore the risks of the project’s failure. In collaboration 
with the R&AE project leaders and portfolio managers, we mapped the R&D stakeholders according 
to attributes of the two largest projects in the fuzzy front-end stage and the two largest in the 
innovative NPD stage in terms of the 2007 annual forecast amount. As stakeholders were identified 
through corporate status (e.g., project leader, development engineering team, patent analyst), a 
convergent map emerged from the analysis of the four projects, independent of the maturity level of 
the project (Figure 1). This is because in the FFE projects, practitioners added some ‘shadow’ 
stakeholders because, at that time, they had not identified the adapted individual for the corporate 
mission, but they knew they had to involve an individual from a part of the organization.  
Collaborators from the CBA sub-department appeared few times in this cartography:  " Technicians and engineers were included in technical engineering teams, and fifty of them 
were central technical leaders (who were 40% dedicated to maintaining the organizational 
capability of body-in-white architecture and manufacturing processes at a worldwide 
competitive level through continuous efforts to renew internal expertise); " CBA’s head managers were engineering development top managers;  " For two projects, collaborators of CBA were R&AE project leaders (one in FFE-product and 
one in innovative NPD-expertise);  " Some customer service pilots, who developed design rules for specific customer expectations 
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and steered the attained performance in car development programs, came from CBA 
(vibration, safety (crash test) and perceived quality (geometry aspect, painting and surface 
quality)); " Some central technical leaders were also members of the suppliers strategy committee (which 
is the group that selects suppliers and is, consequently, the most powerful authority of the 
firm because cars are largely composed of components that are designed and manufactured 
outside of the firm);  " The center competition investigation contained few analysts from CBA; " The CBA department had its own financial controllers. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Map of Internal stakeholders of breakthrough R&D projects of the automotive firm (Analytical 
framework from Mitchell et al, 1997) 
 
 
Understanding the characteristics of the relevant stakeholders for breakthrough R&D projects 
Beyond the mapping of stakeholders’ attributes, the exercise generated a fruitful discussion on the 
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expected role of each stakeholder in breakthrough R&D projects, inside and outside the decision-
making process, because the mapping underlines disparities in the stakeholders’ origin of rights and 
duties and statuses. This part of the analysis, specific to each project, allowed us to characterize the 
relevancy of stakeholders according to the framework of spokesperson / experts & knowers / 
innovative design strategist. For example, as part of automotive projects, the internal stakeholder 
network included few counterparts of the other firms of the automotive industry, but internal 
representatives of external stakeholders appeared spread across the firm according to the stake of the 
external stakeholder that they represented. Thus, members of development teams could express the 
technical interests of a supplier for technical stakes, while a member of the Purchasing Department 
would be the spokesperson of the financial requirements and supplier contract.  
Thus, the in-depth analysis of the stakeholder’s interactions allowed us to highlight the precise 
characteristics of the relevant players and the players’ impacts on the progress of and decision 
concerning industrial deployment of the innovative product, process or service.  
Knowers and experts: This group included holders of design skills and knowledge from fuzzy front-
end to new development and validation within the company and active members of many professional 
networks; they individually and collectively had the technical and business ability to implement the 
project. As individuals, they largely contributed to the progress of the project. Beyond their personal 
contribution, they were the only individuals who were able to precisely describe the engineering 
efforts needed to achieve the breakthrough R&D project. Thus, they were the first to detect when 
specific knowledge was missing, and due to their experience with car design, they were able to 
identify other knowers needed for the project. Their membership was essential to convincing the 
adapted engineering teams to become involved, even if their contributions had not been budgeted, and 
to contribute to the design of the innovative product, service or industrial process. 
Spokespersons: The following three major types of efficient mediators were underlined by project 
leaders and managers: the experienced engineering managers and expert leaders, who argued about 
the technical feasibility of innovation and their impact on the firm’s competitive engineering 
capability; the long term market analysts, who represented the end customers throughout the design 
cycle and were in charge of the definition of the Vehicles Programs’ contents in terms of customers’ 
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benefits; and sales managers, who demonstrated that the car market expected innovation. Their 
combined rationales were essential to building and disseminating the value of the innovation projects 
for the firm throughout the stakeholders’ network. They translated the business potential of the 
innovation into the context of the firm, and they demonstrated their legitimacy in the firm’s strategy, 
either in terms of long-term business or innovation capability. 
Innovative design strategists: Project leaders and R&AE managers described two types of innovative 
design strategists, short-term and long-term strategists. On the one hand, members of suppliers 
strategy committees and car program leaders were able to illustrate, through design metaphors, their 
expectations for the next cars of the range. To produce the framing, they combined their vision with 
sales managers’ feedback on customers’ needs, innovation trends within the suppliers’ spheres and 
worldwide car offers. One the other hand, R&AE portfolio managers and cross-range top managers 
produced more conceptual design metaphors for a long-term innovation strategy. They combined their 
vision with corporate strategy and the data provided by business intelligence and forecast analysts on 
worldwide mobility. 
 
Across these categories, top managers of engineering departments and car program leaders were 
highlighted as compulsory stakeholders. Owners of the resources of design partners and the final 
decision of innovation application in a vehicle, they individually and collectively determined the life 
or death of the project. All these managers were senior executives of the automotive industry and 
collaborators of the firm for a long time. They had been selected for the managerial role because they 
were undoubtedly car design experts but were not systematically relevant stakeholders for 
breakthrough R&D projects, especially because they were experts of the car industry’s dominant 
design. Facing the substantial pressure of resources allocation and large personal risks in the case of a 
car program’s failure, they were largely averse to the risk exposure embedded in breakthrough R&D 
projects. Nevertheless, if they supported an R&D project, they could become the best relevant 
stakeholders because they could gather the skills of a knower, a spokesperson and an innovative 
design strategist. Their membership allowed the firm to create the context conditions to develop and 
commercialize an innovative product. Allied to innovative design strategists, their combined powerful 
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positions in the organization oriented and guided the innovation strategies to implement a sustainable 
strategic vision for the company through the consistent deployment of new products in the range and 
time through the optimum allocation of resources.  
 
Focus on design partners: Quantitative analysis of resources involvement of Fuzzy Front-End 
and innovative NPD engineering stakeholders 
Repeatedly, project leaders underlined the commitment of competent engineering resources at the 
right time as the main issue in the management of breakthrough R&D projects. As engineering sub-
departments held technical resources, projects were carried out in cooperation with several parts of 
the organization that had the knowledge and know-how to complete those of the Research and 
Advanced Engineering project team. The main barrier concerned the expertise held by resources 
outside the organizational perimeter of the R&AE sub-department. As the R&AE department steered 
the innovation projects portfolio, R&AE engineers were managed by the same top managers, and 
resources allocation was easier to commit in breakthrough R&D projects. By contrast, industrial 
engineering teams did not have the same managers. Project leaders claimed that the most difficult 
stakeholders to involve were car development experts, such as those in the CBA department, who 
were both crucial for the success of breakthrough innovation transfer to commercial development 
programs and extremely constrained by the short-term needs of ongoing development car programs. 
Project leaders often stated that resources of development engineering dedicated to breakthrough 
R&D were under-consumed due to the massive disengagement of technical organization areas. 
According to them, divergences between the forecast scenarios (budget and quarterly reforecasting) 
and effective resources consumption were strong and repeated across projects. In interviews, they 
were likely to attribute these variations to the contributory department’s (which we refer to as design 
partners) lack of resources commitment to innovation activity, while decision makers supported the 
hypothesis of an intrinsic difficulty of innovation related to the hazards of breakthrough R&D design, 
which often lead to re-scheduling the most costly actions (tests, prototypes). 
 
To quantify the real involvement of design partners in breakthrough R&D projects, we made a 
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detailed analysis of the firm’s accounting data. Similar to all the other activities of the firm, R&AE 
projects had management control of the use of human and financial resources. Thus, all design 
partners had to enter the following information into the company’s accounting system: the number of 
hours that they had planned to devote to the project during the budget construction and then, month by 
month and individually, the time that they had actually spent on the activity. Analyzing these data 
monthly, the network of expertise sought by each project could be quantitatively rebuilt given that the 
accounting database informed us of the hierarchical engineering sector of the designer and the 
intensity of his collaboration and the diversity of the organizational areas involved. With these data, 
we were able to construct engineering stakeholders’ network of engineering according to: " The evolution of project weight in total costs and effective divergence with forecasts;  " The expense distribution in the company following the technical maturity of projects (FFE or 
innovative NPD maturity);  " The internal skills involved (technical cross-organizational network).  
Therefore, we were able to reconstruct the engineering life of the projects that we analyzed. We were 
particularly interested in differential accounting transactions, as they traced the difficulties of 
budgeting, engagement and disengagement of the players in correlation with the process of 
identification and commitment of internal stakeholders. 
Accounting sources also contained data related to purchases associated with projects, which allowed 
us to test the managers’ hypothesis. Breakthrough R&D purchases were of the following types: 
prototypes, study contracts or subcontracting (simulations, specialized engineering, research 
laboratories, etc.). The cost of prototypes provided information about the maturity level of the project, 
while contracts spending allowed us to reconstruct the network outside the company that was 
mobilized by the innovation project team. 
Traditionally, this information was delivered through the hierarchical levels of the organization. 
However, after three months of screening these two sources per breakthrough activity, i.e., at the end 
of 2006, we consolidated the data and provided it to all R&AE project leaders and portfolio managers 
on a monthly basis since January 2007. The information that was obtained by the new monitoring tool 
was discussed with them and management controllers. 
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First, accounting data consolidation resulted in a quantitative picture of characteristics of the 
stakeholders of the engineering of breakthrough R&D projects, their weight in the investment and 
their place in the organization. The deployment of a tool for analysis of resources allocated among the 
various partners committed to a design project led to a short loop visibility of the movement of 
disengagement or over-commitment of the sectors.  
Then, each accounting entry on a breakthrough R&D project was classified according to the deviance 
it presented between the budget and the effective consumption of resources. When the difference was 
less than 50% of the forecasts, we labeled it as limited deviation, and when it was more than 50%, it 
was labeled as a strong deviation. If it was negative, it confirmed the disengagement claimed by 
project leaders. If it was positive and it appeared few times, it demonstrated an over-commitment of 
engineering department not mentioned by project leaders. We also found entries without links to 
forecast whether the allocated resources had not been spent or, conversely, resources had been 
consumed without being forecasted. Table 3 synthesizes the effective percentage of organizational 
areas that had divergences between the budget and effective costs in 2007. 
Table 3: Quantitative analysis of the criticality of deviations of accounting transactions  
 
Maturity stage of breakthrough R&D 
Fuzzy Front-end  Innovative NPD  
% of organizational areas 
involved in 
Disengagement 
Limited* 5,2 15,3 
Strong** 3,4 16,7 
Complete 5,4 24,1 
Total 14 % 56,1 % 
% of organizational areas 
involved in  
Over-commitment 
Limited* 2,7 7,5 
Strong** 2,4 6,8 
Complete 3,1 7,5 
Total 8,1 % 21,8 % *Limited!deviation!(Less!than!50!%!of!the!budget),!**Strong!deviation!(More!than!50%!of!the!budget)!!
Quantitative analysis confirmed the R&AE project leaders’ intuition concerning the massive 
withdrawal of engineering resources. The under-consumption of resources was particularly strong 
when R&AE projects were in the innovative NPD stage, where the lack of the resources expected had 
exceeded 40% of strong or complete disengagement. Undoubtedly, the uncertain nature of the 
breakthrough R&D projects could be at the origin of divergences between forecast scenarios and the 
actual need of design teams, but the top-managers’ hypothesis appeared insufficient to explain why 
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such a high percentage of organizational areas were consistently downward. The quantitative analysis 
allowed us to understand why the leaders’ and managers’ views differed. Specifically, the non-
consumption of resources, although massive in the innovative NPD stage, was partially offset by an 
over-commitment to other activities and diluted by the equilibrium in FFE engineering. As the 
accounting information that was given to top managers was consolidated at the portfolio level, the 
joint balance phenomena hid the range of disengagement in the specific phase of innovative NPD. 
Consequently, they had the information concerning the partial under-consumption of resources 
(approximately 20% at the R&AE portfolio level), but they mostly were discovering the heterogeneity 
and the strength of accounting divergences at the project level. For many of the top managers, the 
existence of strong over-commitment, even complete (i.e., without having been budgeted), in nearly 
20% of the projects in the R&AE portfolio was a surprise. 
 
A focus on the 8 R&AE projects realized with the CBA department helped to clarify the phenomenon 
from an internal R&D stakeholders’ perspective. Table 4 details the divergences between the forecast 
scenario of the budget that was planned in 2006 and the effective expenses in 2007. 
Four main reasons for deviations were highlighted, as follows: " Punctual contribution of very specific individuals for an unforeseen need of competence 
(typically, highly specific expertise or technical skills such as calculus), as in projects A, B, D 
and F. Knowers and experts involved in the project played a crucial in establishing the prompt 
commitment of the needed individuals; " Transfer of resource to another design partner whose skills and knowledge were needed to 
maintain the efficient progress of the project, as in projects D, E, and F. Innovative design 
strategists were the major players in obtaining the commitment of new organizational areas 
during the year and pushing their rapid formalization in quarterly forecast updates; " Positive alignment of design partners that collectively increased their consumption of 
resources for the project, as in projects C, E, and G. This phenomenon appeared when the 
entire network of engineering stakeholders placed trust in the industrial competitiveness of 
the innovation and its viability within the firm’s industrial development process. 
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Consequently, both spokespersons and innovation design strategists played an active role; " Negative alignment of design partners that collectively decreased their allocation of resources 
to the project, as in projects D, H, and I. This rejection of the project occurred as soon as one 
of the design players expressed his fears about the viability of the project within the company. 
If the R&AE team and relevant stakeholders did not succeed in reversing this feeling quickly, 
engineering stakeholders largely retracted their resources and reallocated them for other 
activities with better chances of achievement. 
The first two types of deviations operated without largely disturbing the forecasted annual investment 
in the R&AE project; the two other social mechanisms were at the origin of the deeper deviations.  
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Table 4. Focus on the sub-engineering department of Assembly & Paint Body 
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CBA 
FFE- 
Expertise 
A 285 0 1 -63,4** 1 
Solicitation of the entity during the year.  
The project was in a technical lock-in and 
asked for the help of a specific technical 
expert. As none satisfactory solution 
emerged, most engineering stakeholders re-
allocated their resources to other activities. 
B 1045 0 1 -3,1 1 
Solicitation of the entity during the year. The 
project needed a specific technical calculus to 
validate a hypothesis. 
NPD- 
Expertise 
C 1 130 9,1 31 25,8* 327,9** 
Strong Over-commitment. 
Transfer to industrial development started 
earlier than expected, which accelerated the 
involvement of CBA resources 
D 306 100 77,6 0,4 -22,4* 
Limited disengagement to transfer resources 
to another organizational area.  
Facing a specific technical lock-in that could 
be solved by the experts of another 
organizational areas, some resources had 
been transfer to them at the middle of the 
year. 
E 4 750 100 100 21,4* 21,4* 
Limited over commitment but important in 
financial amount. 
Strategic project of renewing manufacturing 
system. Relying on promising results of first 
2007 quarter, resources from other activities 
had been re-allocated to the project during the 
year to reinforce the assembly team. 
FFE- 
Product 
F 197 100 97,8 1 -1,2 
Weak disengagement to transfer resources to 
another organizational area for a specific 
material analysis by the relevant test team. 
G 13 0 100 100** 100** 
Start of the project during the year. 
The R&AE project was launched at the last 
quarter of 2007 to solve a technical issue that 
emerged on a car program. 
NPD- 
Product 
H 243 20,6 3,8 -69,9** -94,3** 
Alignment in disengagement. None car 
program manager declared to want this 
innovation for his/ her program. Facing a 
high risk to never been transferred to 
industrial development, the project loosed 
quickly its design partners. 
I 91 13,6 0 -72,2** -100** 
Alignment in disengagement. Supplier 
strategic committee stated that a leading 
supplier had proposed a similar but less 
expensive innovation. The R&AE team did 
not succeed to convince engineering 
stakeholders of the specific value of their 
proposals. Engineering teams stopped to 
contribute to the project in few weeks. *Limited!deviation!(Less!than!50!%!of!the!budget),!**Strong!deviation!(More!than!50%!of!the!budget)! 
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Discussion: what indicates relevancy in the management of internal R&D stakeholders? 
 The analyses of the organizational study with the internal stakeholders’ map (cf. Figure 1) and the 
accounting study (cf. Table 3 and Table 4) both provided us with fertile background to discuss, 
qualitatively and quantitatively, our research question concerning stakeholders’ relevancy for 
breakthrough R&D projects. 
 
Stable organizational network within relevant stakeholders dynamically commit individuals  
The literature underlines the necessity to identify and involve key NPD stakeholders as early as 
possible; this process is implicitly considered as achievable by fuzzy front-end and innovative NPD 
actors. Yet, in the case of disruptive innovations, the degree of unknown about efficient technical 
contents and competitive business models could be quite high at the beginning of the project. Thus, 
the progress is fully unpredictable during the first steps of fuzzy front-end. These unknown influences 
were described by Pich, Loch and de Meyer (2002) as “Unknown unknowns” in contrast to “known 
unknown”, which are uncertain but identified dimensions. When these “Unk Unks” affect the 
progress of a breakthrough R&D project, new internal stakeholders may be needed, as was the case 
for projects A, B, D and F, but new affected actors could also emerge as detractors of the project. 
Thus, the current study confirmed the dynamics of the network of internal R&D stakeholders that 
were previously underlined by Mitchell et al. (97) and Elias et al. (2002). Our stakeholders mapping 
analysis further demonstrated that dynamics primarily operate on the role played by relevant 
stakeholders — the knowers, the spokespersons and innovative design strategists — rather than on the 
organizational areas of the stakeholders, which previously remained stable from one project to another 
(Fig. 1). Indeed, at the beginning of an R&AE project, the following essential actors were needed to 
make the project launch decision: the owners of resources for fuzzy front-end engineering, R&AE 
portfolio managers and long-term market analysts. Beyond this first round, a brief analysis of the 
dominant design dimensions that the project targeted, according to the incomplete innovative goals 
(Pich, Loch and de Meyer, 2002), allowed us to identify a preliminary set of internal actors that could 
affect or be affected by the project’s achievement. To identify the organizational areas of these 
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stakeholders, front-end actors rely on the organizational segmentation that is typically based on 
routine development activities and remain stable over the years (Dosi, 88; Henderson & Clark, 1990). 
The case study underlined that relevant stakeholders played a crucial role in filling the gap between 
the organizational identification and the involvement of a specific actor. Specifically, experts and 
innovation design strategists identified individuals, and spokespersons played an active role in 
obtaining these individuals’ commitment to the value definition process.  
Moreover, the organizational segmentation must be a priori inappropriate to represent the network of 
internal stakeholders of a breakthrough R&D project precisely because it is the structural transcription 
of the dominant design that the project seeks to disturb. A successful achievement of a breakthrough 
R&D project must assume that the entire stakeholders network adopted the new design rules. If the 
stakeholder network remains stable, as in our case study, the intrusiveness of the innovation project is 
limited by a core-rigidity at the managerial-level systems (Leonard-Barton, 1992). However, 
breakthrough innovations exist in large firms, and our case study gathered information about 
successful experiences of intrusive innovation. Inadequate organization did not impair innovation 
deployment. One plausible explanation for the ability of firms to overcome a flawed organizational 
structure is that a set of relevant stakeholders can generate an ephemeral organization to support the 
innovation project progress through the involvement of appropriate NPD stakeholders with specific 
skills or knowledge independent of their organizational areas. In our case study, the ability to shift 
from the dominant design stakeholders network to the breakthrough R&D network was correlated 
with the technical expertise and business mastery of the dominant design from the first network 
members mobilized by the project team.  
 
Waves of engagement generated by relevant stakeholders 
Analyzing resources consumption for R&AE projects, we found that the effect of the innovative 
design advancement on NPD organization was similar to waves. Experts that were close to technical 
lock-in were quickly identified and strongly involved in resources, as the design rules could be largely 
improve by learning about new solutions, while distant experts were more weakly and later affected.  
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The detailed tracking of accounting data showed that strength and temporality of the breakthrough 
R&D project impact could potentially follow propagation logic other than the functional division of 
the organization. Stakeholders who were identified by an organizational analysis as key actors could 
be weakly impacted, but we observed that they became relevant stakeholders when they were able to 
convey useful knowledge to potentially heavily affected actors inside their organization. This deferred 
identification appeared clearly in the accounting analysis, as some organizational areas left the design 
activity and were replaced by others. As the speed of the allocation transfer quickened, the relevant 
stakeholders became more efficient, and we found a correlation between the velocity of the waves and 
the stakeholders’ proficiency in the skills and knowledge content according to the organization of the 
dominant design. This results leads us to highlight the correlation of the ability to shift from the 
dominant design stakeholders network to a breakthrough R&D network with the technical expertise of 
the dominant design of the relevant stakeholders, whether they were Knowers, Spokespersons or 
Innovation design strategist. They appeared to be able to create strong alignment of the entire network 
of design partners, with a positive or negative impact on the project, as they knew the information 
concerning project potential or risks to disseminate in the network to speed up or obstruct the activity. 
 
Conclusion 
Facing the issue of establishing sustainable learning dynamics and design partnerships across the 
R&AE and Industrial development parts of the organization (O’Connor, 2008), project leaders and 
managers of breakthrough R&D projects must develop an efficient system of managing internal R&D 
stakeholders (Elias et al., 2002). Our research shows that a stakeholder network in a large industrial 
firm could be organizationally persistent without inducing the lock-in of innovation capability. 
Nevertheless, dynamics are numerous and large within the network. First, the roles played by key 
stakeholders within this cartography shift, and some of the stakeholders, as knowers, spokespersons 
and innovation design strategists, contribute more than others. Second, engineering resources follow 
contrasted dynamics of over-commitment or massive dis-engagement within the internal stakeholder 
network that are hidden by reporting at the portfolio level.  
Beyond technical stakes and the major role played by engineering stakeholders, in our case study, 
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knowers, spokespersons and innovative design strategists went beyond support of the project’s 
progress. Their impacts appeared more similar to internal business angels of breakthrough R&D that 
operate in combination with an intrapreneur (Kelley and Lee, 2010; Borjesson et al, 2014) or 
architectural manager of the new design rules (Baldwin and Clark, 2000). Thus, the mastery of 
dominant design seems to be one way to build and maintain an efficient capability for innovation, but 
it is not the only method. This result needs to be further investigated and deepened in future research. 
Moreover, the research opens new directions for accounting management adapted to major innovation 
projects and new accounting tools. 
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